

CHANGE AND PSEUDO-CHANGE IN SOCIOLOGY

CHRIS R. TAME



The last decade has clearly witnessed the shattering of the sociological consensus. We seem far removed from the time when, in 1954, Ely Chinoy could declare that “the days of competing schools, each employing a distinct conceptual apparatus, are almost gone”¹ or even from Donald MacRae’s statement, in 1968, that an intellectual “lull”, a sociological “unity” had been achieved, and only “a long period of logical refinement, and cleaning-up operations awaits us”.² Instead, what has occurred has been the explosive emergence of a myriad competing claimants to the mantle of revolution or “paradigm change” in sociology. Phenomenology, ethnomethodology, symbolic-interactionism, critical theory, “new”, “reflexive”, “radical”, and “humanistic” sociologies have all laid claim to the honour of being the agent of transformation. Yet, while noting their common elements, a commitment to “liberation”, to “self-determination” and to various views of individual autonomy against “social forces”, it is necessary to observe, as one self-proclaimed “humanistic sociologist” has indeed done, that:

... it is not clear at all ... how the various ‘elements’, or, better, manifestations [of the “great first-order fissure” in contemporary sociology] cohere or are even compatible: the ‘radicalism’ and struggle-orientation-even-unto-violence-if-need-be of some, with the dignity-preservation-for-all at almost any cost to others; the roles of prophet, soldier, healer, light-bringer ... leader, planner, liberator, and — can it be? — controller.³

To what extent does the smoke of a somewhat self-satisfied bandying of new jargon and labels conceal the absence of any real fire of change? To what extent does allegedly revolutionary disputation with the orthodox tradition actually share with that tradition a cumulative background of ideas and numerous fundamental assumptions? — as Ernest Becker has queried with reference to similar conflicts in the past.⁴ How far has *real* change occurred?

I: Dennis Wrong’s “Skeptical Sociology”

Dennis Wrong’s *Skeptical Sociology* (Heinemann, London, 1977; subsequent bracketed page numbers refer to this work) is no mere late-comer to the ranks of contenders for the ‘revolution-

ary’ honours. Wrong has been a distinguished and long-standing (if insufficiently known in Britain) contributor to the growing stream of criticism of the structural-functional orthodoxy. This book thus gathers together most of his major published essays, dating from 1959, along with a number of previously unpublished items. Ranging in character from scholarly polemics to serious contributions on major issues in sociological theory and general discussions of diverse topics in politics and political theory. They present us with a timely illustration of the general direction of the ‘new’ and ‘humanist’ streams of thought, and numerous (‘reflexive’!) reflections on the actual diversity of such intellectual currents. In examining the character of Wrong’s own work, his observations on contemporary sociology, and the questions he both raises and fails to raise, we can go some way in assessing the true status of the ‘new sociologies’.

II: Human Nature and Individual Autonomy

In perhaps the most valuable section of the book, the “Prologue” and Part One on “Human Nature and the Perspective of Sociology”, Wrong provides a much needed criticism of some fashionable trends. An established critic of the positivism and “scientism” of structural functionalism, he explains his reasons for no longer calling his own view “humanistic” — not the least of which is its “self-congratulatory aura” (p. 2) and its use as a “virtual synonym for an *engage* sociology aligned politically with the Left” (p. 2). Although indeed (in American terms) a “liberal” and “a man of the left”, Wrong does not hesitate to proffer some biting criticism of the so-called “Critical Theory” of the Frankfurt School and its followers. Not a few will welcome his declaration that the “critical theorists” possess no monopoly on the “reflexive” perspective, the critique of positivism, a critical perspective on the *status quo*, or on adherence to a “utopian” vision”. That critical theory’s criticism seems remarkably parochial and one-sided, focused principally on the West and ignoring the conditions in socialist and Marxist states whose existence (whatever the status of their claims to such titles) poses certain analytical problems, is a point all too infrequently raised. Wrong’s comments on “the increasingly shadowy contours of ‘socialism’ as an ideal”, its use as a “god-term” (p. 9), and likewise his sad observation that Marxism is now “surely the most trendy tendency in the sociological academy” (p. 51) will provide a courageous and refreshing exercise in intellectual scepticism and independence for those who have read the voluminous “radical” writings and experienced their growing concrete influence.

The core of Wrong’s work, however, and indeed his most well-known contribution to the critique of structural-functionalism, is “The Over-Socialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology”. This essay, his “Postscript” to it, and its companion piece, “Human Nature and the Perspective of Sociology”, constitutes perhaps the most telling and well-reasoned criticism of the holistic and deterministic outlook of conventional sociology. The latter’s “model of human nature, sometimes clearly stated, more often implicit in accepted concepts” (p. 35) is one of man as overwhelmingly an “acceptance seeker”, a passive internaliser of external social norms. Wrong does not, of course, deny the social nature of man, the existence of the “vexatious fact of society” (to use Dahrendorf’s phrase) but objects rather to the generalizing of a “particular selective emphasis”, and the subsequent “extremely one-sided view of human nature” (p. 41), while ignoring or minimizing the “obvious and massive fact” (p. 62) of human choice and autonomy.

Much of this critique, the appreciation of a far greater degree of human autonomy than was ever recognized by even the most “balanced” of the older sociologists, is now, with the growth of varied “humanistic” trends in sociology, anthropology, and psychology, quite widely accepted⁵ — although Wrong’s view of it as largely “absorbed into the conventional wisdom of the discipline” (p. 47) surely goes too far and begs a great many ques-

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25 Chapter Chambers, Esterbrooke Street, London SW1P 4NN
www.libertarian.co.uk email: admin@libertarian.co.uk

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Director: Dr Chris R. Tame

Editorial Director: Brian Micklethwait

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tions. What is particularly noteworthy at this moment, however, is Wrong's recognition of the extent to which many of the "new" sociologies still share much of the traditional, deterministic image of man. Thus, symbolic interactionism, in spite of its stress on the role-making aspects of human interaction and its perceptive "readings" of the realities of social intercourse, draws heavily on the work of George Herbert Mead and Harry Stack Sullivan, both of whom present a concept of the self characterized by a distinct "lack of any motivational energies of its own" (p. 66), as a "social self", the product of "the reflected appraisals of others" (Sullivan) and the internalizing of the "generalized other" (Mead⁶). As Wrong puts it:

Symbolic interactionists are not guilty ... of suggesting that men are conformist automatons ... Nevertheless [they] still see resistance to social demands and expectations as essentially a by-product, though an inevitable one, of socialization. The essence of man is 'the presentation of self in everyday life', even though it is recognized that the social world is discontinuous and permits some individuality and some resistance to social control to flourish in the interstices between rules and institutions. Instead of [as in structural-functionalism] successful 'tension management' imposed by the imperative of the social system, 'impression management' under the dominance of the self, a theatrical impresario cannily sizing up his audience, becomes the compelling social reality. Both views, though in different ways, present an oversocialized conception of man. (p. 67)

Similarly, much of the work of "radical" and anti-functionalist "conflict theorists" adopts either vague concepts of the dynamics of "objective conditions" and conflicting "interests" (which actually need further psychological explication) and Marxist reifications of class and history, or other views equally as holistic and deterministic as those of the functionalists. "Their denial that society is a self-equilibrating system in the structural-functionalist sense", Wrong writes, "merely leads them to stress socialization in subgroups within total societies that are at odds with one another, as opposed to being united by an overarching, shared value system" (p. 60). The most notable example of the latter, of course, is that of Gerth and Mills who, in *Character and Social Structure*, "subscribed to conceptions of socialization that scarcely differed from those of Parsons and his fellow functionalists" (p. 48).⁷

On the subject of C. Wright Mills, Wrong in fact includes a full essay, an appraisal of "C. Wright Mills and the Sociological Imagination", which contains a number of critical observations on the hero and inspiration of much "radical" sociology, regarding whom a certain degree of "demystification" is certainly long overdue. While justly praising *The Sociological Imagination*, Wrong points to "the striking discrepancy between Mills' own work and [his] admirable conception of what sociology ought to be ..." (p. 28). Thus, much of Mills' work is actually characterized by its lack of an historical and comparative perspective, an absence of a truly rigorous reasoning to follow up imaginative insights and suggestions (most notably in his work on the power elite, where it was left to others to really clinch the case against "pluralism"), and the "grand theory" orientation of *Character And Social Structure*. It is a pity that Wrong does not include here his equally important and biting *political* observations, made in *Partisan Review*, regarding the statist and authoritarian inclinations of Mills.⁸

III: Freudian Fallacies

Unfortunately, however, much of Wrong's own alternative conception of human psychology is drawn from Freudianism, emphasising the "somatic, animal roots of our emotional lives" (p. 54). Here Wrong is open to the same sort of criticism he has made of Gerth and Mills, that he is subjecting Man to simply another form of determinism. He is not only apparently un-

ware of the devastating criticisms of Freudianism available,⁹ and the extent of its predominantly deterministic nature,¹⁰ but neglects the large body of "humanist" or "third force" psychology. The writings of the latter movement provide detailed and well-reasoned concepts of human nature ("social, but not entirely socialized"), and of the limits of socialization.¹¹ Wrong's knowledge of the burgeoning humanistic movement in psychology seems, alas, confined to some of the more anti-rational group psychotherapies distinguished (as he rightly points out) by anti-individualistic celebrations of group-induced emotion and of public self-exposure (p. 2).¹²

IV: The Sociological Bias

In the last two essays of this section, "The Idea of Community: A Critique" and "Identity: Problem and Catchword", Wrong makes a number of valid criticisms of two widely used concepts and of the prospects of measures aimed at the restoration of "community" and secure "identity". Unfortunately, he fails to get to grips with the issue of their true scientific status and its significance for sociology. Herein we thus find a further example of the limits of the critique of traditional sociology. Although well aware of Nisbet's famous work on the conservative-collectivist origins of sociology,¹³ and citing Leon Bramson's less well-known, but important, *The Political Context of Sociology*,¹⁴ Wrong does not subject these two central concepts to a truly critical analysis — indeed, he even seems to share, to a degree, their holistic-collectivist assumptions regarding the alleged need for rootedness, stability, and socially guaranteed identity. Yet such sociological concepts and theories rest, as Bramson pointed out, "not on empirical research alone, but on a specifically anti-liberal [i.e. anti-individualist] philosophical approach to modern society." They are "derived from a number of assumptions concerning modern society few of them proven or even provable by scientific methods ... they do not involve questions of fact, but rather, questions of fact structured by and saturated with values. They resemble philosophical rather than scientific propositions."¹⁵ Bramson illustrated his thesis by reference to "mass society and culture" theory. A great deal of contemporary work in urban sociology has similarly demonstrated the inadequacy of what have proved to be essentially normative and holistic concepts in this area.

V: Power, Conflict and Change

The essays in Part Two provide generally penetrating contributions to the criticism of structural-functionalism for its neglect of power, group conflict, and historical change — very well trodden ground by now, of course, if less so when originally published. Wrong's essentially Weberian analysis provides a sound explication of concepts (especially in "Social Inequality Without Social Stratification", re-affirming with welcome clarity a number of distinctions that are (as he says) widely, if not always clearly, recognized in theory while often ignored in research practice, and underlining the continued relevance of these concepts and distinctions to the understanding of contemporary social trends. Unfortunately, however, while Wrong is himself well aware of the danger in "retracing familiar ground", of "perpetuating the larger failure of so much contemporary sociological theory to overcome its purely definitional character, its tendency to produce a distinctive nomenclature rather than significant propositions about social reality" (p. 121), and stresses "that conceptual analysis should lead directly into the elucidation of social processes and historical trends with which we are directly familiar" (p. 121), his own work still pays virtually no attention to the real structure and dynamics of power and privilege in contemporary America.¹⁶ It is a serious approach to sociology that virtually every major empirical contribution to our knowledge of the realities of power has come from outside the sociological profession, whether from "New Left" historians and writers, "right wing" conspiratorialists, or radical libertarian economists and theorists.¹⁷

The final section of the book is — as the author admits — a somewhat more heterogeneous collection of essays united only superficially in their concern with varied issues of “Power and Politics”, they range from relatively theoretical discussions, through a criticism of Robert Heilbroner (one of America’s leading contemporary socio-economic Cassandras), to a celebratory introduction to Weber and an explication of “Ends and Means in Politics”. It also contains perhaps the weakest essay (although one of Wrong’s self-proclaimed favourites) on “The Rhythm of Democratic Politics”, in which he delineates the thesis that “democratic societies ... experience a cyclical alteration of periods dominated by protest from the Left and retrenchment by the Right” (p. 226). Wrong, however, offers no real analysis of, or justification for, these misleading, vague and emotive terms which, as his own essay actually demonstrates, beg so many questions and function as semantic weapons by which an ideology can lay claim to virtue and label its rival opprobriously. It is again a cause for reproach that neither sociology nor political science has produced systematic and convincing analyses of this common categorization. Once more it has been left to journalists, academics in other disciplines, or activists, who feel such loaded stereotypes do no justice to their own beliefs, to engage in such tasks.¹⁸ That this essay originally appeared in a volume, *The New Conservatives: A Critique from the Left*,¹⁹ intended as a counterblast to the works of a group of writers also frequently termed revisionist “liberals” — men of undoubtedly scholarly objectivity whose analysis and policy prescriptions were distinguished by a growing disillusionment with the failure of traditional so-called “leftist” (that is, state interventionist or socialist) policies — surely indicates how value-laden such categorization and terminology can be.

VI: Monica Morris’ “Creative Sociology”

Monica B. Morris’ *An Excursion Into Creative Sociology* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977; subsequent bracketed page numbers refer to this work) provides an interesting contrast to Wrong’s work, while serving to underline many of the points I have made so far. An admittedly partisan work, it is designed to serve as a relatively comprehensible introduction to the range of phenomenological, ethnomethodological, and interactionist perspectives she designates as “creative sociology”. Their common character, in her view, is that:

[A]ll have an image of human beings as creating reality in interaction with others. They all call into question the deterministic notion that the ‘solid structures’ of society act as forces on the individual, deciding his fate. They all use methods of study that are different from the natural-science methods of positivistic sociology. (p. 42)

However, that an introduction, a “simplification” and demystification, even, of such streams of thought should prove necessary constitutes more than a little reproach to their proponents. As she points out, they “present their programmatic statements in language so obscure that many readers become quickly confused, frustrated and discouraged. Terminology is introduced that is far from self-explanatory, sentences are tortuous, much chaff surrounds the wheat of wisdom that awaits those patient enough to sift through the terrible wordiness.” (p. viii) Indeed! Moreover, much of the jargon is quite indefensible (do we *really* need to call objectivity, open-mindedness or absence of presuppositions, “performing the epoche”, “bracketing”, or “reduction”?), masks either repetition, prolixity, and assertion (rather than validation), or simplicity, banality, and truism²⁰ which is anything but “profoundly complex”. (p. viii)

In fact, Morris performs her self-appointed task remarkably well. She delineates the principal achievements of the “creative” sociologies, their analysis of “the amazingly ordinary phenomenon of daily life” (p. ix), the structure and tactics of ordinary language and discourse, with facility. Her account of her own research into the justifications by newspaper editors of the nature

of their treatment of the Women’s Liberation Movement (pp. 108-114) is particularly incisive and interesting, as is her description of the work of Fishman, West and Zimmerman, and Cicourel and Kitsuse on the role of expectation and linguistic conflict in ordinary life. Yet, while noting the differences among the various “creative” sociologies, Morris is too expository and insufficiently analytical. To what extent does “creative sociology” depart from the core assumptions of the traditional paradigm? Her account of Mead shows no recognition of the deterministic orientation of his work, although she does note that Berger and Luckmann’s work “appears to smack considerably more of social determinism than do other phenomenological approaches” (p. 59) and cites Jack Douglas’s comments that “in the grafting of structural ideas onto situational analyses, Berger and Luckmann have largely denied the necessary freedom of individuals implicit in the whole idea of situated meaning and have reinstated the ‘objectified’ absolutist tyranny of the structuralists.” (p. 166) The question she fails to ask is, to what extent the “creative sociologies” have either disposed of the “deterministic notion” or adequately and systematically dealt with the exact limits of socialization and social constraints. Her failure in this respect is that of “creative sociology” as a whole. Peter Berger’s *Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective*²¹ for example, presents no more (probably less) of a systematic discussion of the role and limits of socialization and the status of *homo sociologicus* than did Ralf Dahrendorf in his famous essay “Homo Sociologicus” and its postscript, “Sociology and Human Nature”.²²

VII: Change and Pseudo-Change

Both Wrong and Morris leave us, then, if not with any *direct* answer to our initial question — how far has real change occurred in contemporary sociology? — at least with a clearer picture of the points at issue and of their significance. If the new trends in sociology represent manifestations of a “view of man as having a measure of autonomy, choice and self-determination”,²³ *what* is the extent of that choice and at what point does it constitute a quantum jump from the traditional sociological view? To what extent, moreover, does sociology *qua* science necessarily focus on the “socialization” process, or depend upon *homo sociologicus* as either an allegedly true representation of human nature or a self-conscious construct, a heuristic tool? And to what extent do the “humanistic” propositions either constitute or need to be developed into, a new “paradigm”? Wrong at least indicates implicitly his attitude when he declares that he has “no intention of creating a new movement or tendency within sociology”. In his view “sceptical sociologists may wryly recognize a kinship with one another under various disguises, but it would be self-defeating for them to organize as a group or even to adopt a common label. In the end, there can be no such thing as a sceptical sociology, only sceptical sociologists.” (p. 14)

For those, however, whose skepticism goes further, who adhere to a much broader rejection of the holistic and determinist concepts and values inherited by sociology from classical conservatism (and reinforced by the more collectivist varieties of socialism), a different task lies ahead. In perhaps the most forthright and successful attempt so far to outline a voluntaristic or individualistic sociology, that of Dick Atkinson,²⁴ we find a clear recognition that many of the “critics and dissenters, the advocates of an alternative, radical sociology [are] in fact ... part of the orthodox consensus”, and that this is a measure of the crisis facing sociology and students of sociology.²⁵ If a thoroughly new sociological paradigm is to emerge, a sociology that is a “science of liberty”, methodologically, psychologically, and normatively individualistic, then a great deal more radical thought and change will have to take place.

NOTES

1. Ely Chinoy, *Sociological Perspective: Basic Concepts and Their Application*, Random House, New York, 1945, p. iv.
2. David G. MacRae, "Introduction" to Percy S. Cohen, *Modern Social Theory*, Heinemann, London, 1968, p. viii.
3. John R. Seeley, "Humanizing the Superconscious: A Foreword to 'Humanistic Society' and a Prelude to a Humane Society" in John F. Glass and John R. Staude, eds., *Humanistic Society: Today's Challenge to Sociology*, Goodyear Publishing, Pacific Palisades, California, 1972, p. xvi.
4. Ernest Becker, *The Structure of Evil: An Essay on the Unification of the Science of Man*, George Braziller, New York, 1968, p. 403, Note 1.
5. For useful summaries of, and introductions to, such trends, see Fred W. Voget, "Man and Culture: An Essay in Changing Anthropological Interpretations", *American Anthropologist*, (26)6, December 1960 and Mary Ellen Goodman, *The Individual and Culture*, The Dorsey Press, Homewood, Illinois, 1967.
6. A similar recognition of the rather grim and deterministic image of man in ethnomethodology can be found in John F. Glass, "The Humanistic Challenge to Sociology" in Glass and Staude, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
7. Another criticism of Gerth and Mill's holism and determinism can be found in the important but neglected essay by Benjamin Schwartz, "The Socio-Historic Approach", *World Politics*, VIII(1), October 1955, especially pp. 141-43. Schwartz points out that in their work the person is "nothing more than a combination of internalized social roles which, in turn, are part of the social process" (p. 141). Alastair MacIntyre, in "Breaking the Chains of Reason", in E. P. Thomson, ed., *Out of Apathy*, New Left Books, Stevens and Sons, London, 1960, also accuses Mills of sharing, with Parsons, "the deterministic vision of man" and giving, in his work, "no picture ... of the resistances that man can and does offer to such processes" (p. 224).
8. In "Reading from Left to Right", *Partisan Review*, XXX(2), Summer 1963, Wrong quoted extensively from Mills' selected essays, *Power, Politics and People*, to illustrate the obvious attraction power, when wielded by the correct, enlightened hands, held for him. He thus concluded that "Mills sometimes sounds as though what he most wanted was to be President of the United States. Long before he became briefly an apologist for Castro's dictatorship and began to give Khrushchev's Russia the benefit of too many doubts, there was an unpleasant note in his preoccupation with power: he never tired of blasting the 'power elite', but he had a strange mixture of contempt for their intellectual mediocrity with a desire to stand in their shoes, and this feeling seemed to occupy him more than did his vision of a more fraternal, decentralized society." (p. 96)
9. For example, Andrew Salter, *The Case Against Psychoanalysis*, Henry Holt, New York, 1952/Medical Publications, London, 1953; Richard LaPiere, *The Freudian Ethic*, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1959; Sebastian de Grazia, *Errors of Psychotherapy*, Doubleday, New York, 1952; Coyne H. Campbell, *Induced Delusions: The Psychopathy of Freudism*, Regent House, Chicago, 1958; and Maurice Natenberg, *The Case History of Sigmund Freud*, Regent House, Chicago, 1958. The telling arguments of such writers, of course, do not necessarily vindicate their own alternative propositions.
10. See Isidore Chein, *The Science of Behaviour and the Image of Man*, Basic Books, New York, 1972/Tavistock Publications, London, 1972. Chein observes that "this model [i.e. Freudianism] commonly thought of as a purposive one, leaves Man a passive victim of the interplay between constitution and environment no less than do the non-purposive stimulus-response models. Man, as such, has nothing to do with the outcome. He does nothing; things happen to him." (p. 6)
11. Among a large and growing number, see especially the work of Abraham Maslow, in *Motivation and Personality*, Harper Brothers, New York, 1954, and *Toward A Psychology of Being*, D. Van Nostrand, Princeton, N.J., 1968; Frank G. Goble, *The Third Force: The Psychology of Abraham Maslow*, Grossman, New York, 1970/Victor Gollancz, London, 1972, for a general over-view; and Nathaniel Branden, *The Psychology of Self-Esteem*, Nash Publishing, Los Angeles, 1969, especially his discussion of "volitional consciousness", pp. 36-63.
12. Similar criticisms of such anti-rational tendencies and advocacy of total public self-revelation have been made repeatedly by writers within the humanist tradition itself. See, for example, Nathaniel Branden, *The Disowned Self*, Nash Publishing, Los Angeles, 1977, pp. 127-28, 159, and Sigmund Koch, "Reflections on the State of Psychology", *Social Research*, 38(4), Winter, 1971. Koch especially points to the "ultimate theory of man as a socius" (p. 706), inherent in the ideas of such alleged humanists.
13. Robert A. Nisbet, "Conservatism and Sociology", *American Journal of Sociology*, LVII(2), September 1952; *idem* "The French Revolution and the Rise of Sociology", *idem*, *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIX(2), September 1943; *idem* "De Bonald and the Concept of the Social Group", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, V(3), June 1944; *idem*, *The Sociological Tradition*, Basic Books, New York, 1967, 1970.
14. Leon Bramson, *The Political Context of Sociology*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1961; 2nd edn, 1966.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.
16. It should be noted that he does include some more concrete material in his review article "Jews, Gentiles, and the New Establishment", and in "How Important is Social Class?", on the extent of ethnic loyalties among American "workers".
17. For the New Left, for example, see Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916*, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1963; James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900-1918*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1968; William Domhoff, *The Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America*, Random House, New York, 1971; *idem*, *Fat Cats and Democrats: The Power of the Big Rich in the Party of the Common Man*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972; *idem*, *The Bohemian Grove and Other Retreats: A Study in Ruling-Class Cohesiveness*, Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, New York, 1975. For the so-called "right wing" conspiratorialists see, for example, by Garry Allen, *None Dare Call it Conspiracy*, Concorde Press, Rossmore, California, 1971; *The Rockefeller File*, Concord Press, Seal Beach, California, 1976; and *Who Controls the Press?*, The John Birch Society, Belmont, Massachusetts, 1965. For the radical libertarians see, for example, Richard M. Ebeling, ed., *The Political Economy of Liberal Corporatism*, Centre for Libertarian Studies, New York, 1977, and Murray N. Rothbard and Ronald Radosh, eds., *A New History of Leviathan*, E. P. Dutton, New York, 1972.
18. Thus, see Sam Brittan, *Left and Right: The Bogus Dilemma*, Secker and Warburg, London, 1968, and his "Further Thoughts on Left and Right"; *idem*, *Capitalism and the Permissive Society*, Macmillan, London, 1973; Murray N. Rothbard, "Left and Right: The Prospects for Liberty", in Tibor Machan, ed., *The Libertarian Alternative: Essays in Social and Political Philosophy*, Nelson Hall, Chicago, 1974; Jerome Tuccille, *Radical Libertarianism: A New Political Alternative*, 2nd edn, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1971, especially pp. ix-xix; Lawrence McGann, "The Political Spectrum", *Rampart Journal* (Rampart College, Larkspur, Colorado), III(4), Winter 1967, and the symposium on the subject in the same journal, IV(2), Summer 1968.
19. Lewis A. Coser and Irving Howe, eds., *The New Conservatives: A Critique from the Left*, Quadrangle Books, New York, 1974.
20. See Stanislaw Andreski's biting comments in *Social Sciences as Sorcery*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1974, pp. 246-48, and his general explanation for the prevalence of such pomposity and obscurantism, *passim*.
21. Peter Berger, *Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1966.
22. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Homo Sociologicus*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973.
23. Glass and Staude, *op. cit.*, p. xi.
24. Dick Atkinson, *Orthodox Consensus and Radical Alternative: A Study in Sociological Theory*, Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1971.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 143.