





KARL MARX WAS NOT A SOCIAL SCIENTIST

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Sociological Notes No. 13

ISSN 0267-7113

ISBN 1 85637 051 8

An occasional publication of the Libertarian Alliance,
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This is a revised version of an article first published in *Free Inquiry*, Spring 1991, Vol. 11, No. 2,
under the title 'Was Karl Marx a Social Scientist?'.

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FOR LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY

KARL MARX WAS NOT A SOCIAL SCIENTIST

ANTONY FLEW

The funeral speech that Friedrich Engels gave beside the Highgate grave of his lifelong friend Karl Marx was divided into two parts. In the first Engels claimed that Marx had been great as a sincere and successful seeker after truth: "Just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human history." This part concluded with the claim, "So war dieser Mann der Wissenschaft" ("Thus was this man of science"). In the second part of the eulogy Engels spoke of Marx as a revolutionary, working tirelessly, we are asked to believe, for the enrichment of the poor and the emancipation of the oppressed.

The claim that the achievement of Marx in the field of the human sciences is comparable with that of Darwin in biology is often repeated. It is scarcely surprising when the endorsement comes from a professional revolutionary. Typical of these was Lenin, in *What The "Friends of the People" Are* (1894). He wrote there, with reference to Marx's three-volume work, *Das Kapital*, "It will now be clear that the comparison with Darwin is perfectly accurate." Much later Maurice Cornforth, the official philosopher to the Communist Party of Great Britain (Muscovite), deployed an even bolder and more specific contention: "The methodology by which Marx arrived at his theory of social development is exactly the same as that employed by Darwin in establishing the theory of the evolution of species by natural selection."¹

What should, however, be surprising is that the same claim is still supported today - even if only implicitly - by the large and, we are told, ever-growing number of professing social scientists who offer some degree of allegiance to the theories and putative methods of this particular nineteenth-century predecessor, and no other.²

Among our other contemporaries - however doubtful they have been both about the substance of Marx's sociological contentions and the actual effectiveness of his revolutionary policies as means for achieving those ends - almost all writers about Marx seem to have been willing, even zealous, to endorse the sin-

cerity of his personal commitments both to truth-seeking and to such beneficently liberal human values. The most distinguished of these charitable critics is Sir Karl Popper, for his book *The Open Society and its Enemies* contains perhaps the most comprehensive and overwhelming onslaught ever launched against not only the theoretical but also the practical teachings of Karl Marx.³ Yet throughout both volumes, in all the first four editions, Popper is at pains to distinguish Marx himself, as a genuine scientist, from those professing to be his followers, who have transformed his works into an in principle unfalsifiable, and hence wholly unscientific, dogmatic system. Also, like so many others, Popper seems to have construed the severe hardships endured by both Marx and his family during the earlier years of the London period - hardships consequent upon his chosen way of life - as sufficient reason for accepting him as a paid-up and ever-active member of what David Hume called "the party of mankind".

"THE PHILOSOPHICAL PATH TO COMMUNISM"

It was to be expected, therefore, that there would be protests when Leszek Kolakowski opened his great study of the *Main Currents of Marxism* with the sentence: "Karl Marx was a German philosopher."⁴ Thus the Marxist-Leninist reviewer in *Political Studies* asserts: "Marx was not, in fact a 'German philosopher.' ... No 'philosopher' of the kind Kolakowski has in mind could have written *Capital*, or would have felt any need to write it."⁵ Again, in *New Society* the eponymous leader of the Benno-Bolshevik faction in the British parliament maintained that "unlike many philosophers ... Marx began by a deep study of the real world itself - in order to understand how it worked and why, and then drew his own conclusions."⁶

On the contrary: There is in fact abundant biographical evidence to show that this is the diametric opposite of the truth.⁷ Both Engels and Marx, like Moses Hess before them, were among the few who had, as Engels puts it, "taken the philosophical path to Communism." Hence it was by what Marx himself was pleased to

call a “philosophical analysis” that the main elements of what in their correspondence they were always to call “our theory” or “our view” were originally derived. They were consequently confident that various conclusions Popper would label historicist - a supposed “law of development of human history” and its perceived corollaries - were underwritten by an ineluctable logico-philosophical necessity.

But if revolutionary troops - the poor, bloody infantry of the class struggle - were to be assembled and encouraged by the assurances of inevitable victory and inevitable utopia, then those assurances had to be presented as scientifically based. Anyone who has read H. A. L. Fisher’s *Our New Religion* will easily appreciate that Marx and Engels had the same compelling reason to offer their revelation as *scientific* socialism as Mary Baker Eddy had for offering hers as *Christian Science*. So in the *Communist Manifesto* - a document in almost every other way the opposite of *Science and Health* - Marx and Engels were, as it were, writing a monster post-dated check drawn on an account in the Bank of Scientific Knowledge; an account into which neither of them had as yet contrived to deposit suitably substantial funds.

So none of the world-transforming ideas of the *Manifesto* and none of its enormously important would-be factual contentions were findings from long years of labour poring over bluebooks in the reading room of the British Museum. Instead, it was the supposed (still abstract and general) philosophical proof of these historicist contentions that provided the original incentive to embark upon the political and economic studies eventually resulting in the 1867 publication of Volume I of *Capital* - that being as much of his *magnum opus* as Marx himself could ever be brought to complete. Not only were all the major contentions about human history and human society presented in the *Communist Manifesto* years before Marx first applied for his Reader’s Card, but they are also to be found in still earlier books and manuscripts.

A little later, in an 1852 letter to Weydemeyer, Marx outlines very clearly what he saw to be most crucial and most distinctive in his own supposedly heuristic achievements. He asserts there that he has provided proofs for his theories. But he had not yet in fact produced anything that even looked like empirical social science - even *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* was still seven years in the future. Although in 1845 Marx contracted to compose the decisive “big book” - which Engels always insisted was essential - it was characteristic that he forthwith spent the enviably large advance actually producing nothing but broken promises. Yet that letter to Weydemeyer boasted:

What I did that was new was to prove: (1) that the *existence of classes* is only bound up with

particular, historic phases in the development of production; (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the *dictatorship of the proletariat*; and (3) that this dictatorship only constitutes the transition to the *abolition of all classes* and to a classless society.

THE FUTURE DISCOVERED BY ABSTRACT ANALYSIS

“Karl Marx was a German philosopher.” Both terms in this expression are crucial; for it remains most illuminating to think of Marx as originally and always a philosopher, notwithstanding that nothing in his voluminous works makes any significant contribution to philosophy in any academic understanding of that term. (We have to search elsewhere for an explanation of the prescription of such works as *The German Ideology* in philosophy courses; as if these were philosophical classics on all fours with, say, *A Discourse on the Method* or *A Critique of Pure Reason*!)

It is equally essential to recognise that Marx’s untutored philosophical education was primarily if not exclusively German, achieved under the domination of Hegel. So Marx presumably never read Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* or Hume’s *Treatise of Human Nature*: or, if he did read them, he certainly never realised that he needed to come to terms with the challenges they present. Never having been subjected to probings by what among English-speaking philosophers is now nicknamed “Hume’s Fork”, Marx thus was not forced into our almost obsessive awareness that no discoveries of “matters of fact and real existence” can ever be made by merely maneuvering “the relations of ideas”; and, in particular, that physically necessitating laws of nature are not to be derived from any analysis of the logical necessities and logical impossibilities prevailing in the world of abstractions.

Consequently, Marx seems to have taken if for granted that at least the main lines of future historical development can be discovered by analysing concepts, and that such abstract analysis can yield knowledge of somehow necessary and therefore inexorable laws. Nevertheless a large part of the appeal of Marxism has always been that it is believed to provide not a philosophical, but a scientific proof that utopia will inevitably be attained through revolution;⁸ that, as crude Comrade Khrushchev used to say, “Communism is at the end of all the roads in the world: we shall bury you!”

So how, we should now ask, does the atheist Marx come by his secular revelation? This revelation supposedly guarantees that the not-to-be-too-long-deferred consummatory climax both of all brute “struggle for existence” and of the class conflicts of which all human history allegedly consists must be the

total triumph of “the class to end all classes”; and then, supposedly in consequence and in very short order, the establishment of a conflict-free utopia in which - in the words of the manifesto - “the free development of each will be the condition of the free development of all.”⁹

The answer to the question of the source of the secular revelation is to be found in the contributions of Hegel and his immediate successors. Three are especially relevant. The first is the hardest to characterise. Feuerbach was pointing to it when he said that all speculative philosophers are priests in disguise, and that all the classical German creations - Hegel’s Idea, Fichte’s Ego, and Schelling’s Absolute - were simply substitutes for the Deity, reduced to a more abstract form. The whole climate of opinion was suffused with a profound, providential, post-Christian conviction that, in the end, all manner of things will be well; a usually unstated and therefore never examined or abandoned assumption that, ultimately, the universe is not indifferent to human concerns.

The two further features are inseparably connected. One was an equally profound and equally unexamined assumption that *a priori* reasoning can discover synthetic and somehow necessary truths about both the structure of the universe and our true and proper life within it. Third and last was the fact that such (philosophically) rationalist reasoning was typically, in the world that Hegel made, all-the-balls-in-the-air juggling with terms referring to abstract and indeterminate collectivities. All the key terms in such reasonings, before they begin to be given any useful social scientific application, need to be made precise and provided with strict rules of engagement. There is, for instance, no scientific profit whatsoever to be had from rabbiting on about alienation until and unless we are able to construct a viable alienation index. How else can we hope once and for all to settle the question of whether universal and total state monopoly really is the sovereign remedy for this factitious complaint?

ABSTRACT, ARBITRARY AND UNFALSIFIABLE

To indicate the intellectual climate of this Hegelian universe it is best to begin by quoting one or two sentences from Hegel’s Inaugural Lecture at Heidelberg, noting that in a passing moment of infidel insight Marx himself spoke of “the drunken speculations of this master wizard”. Hegel pronounced:

We shall see ... that in other European countries ... philosophy, excepting the name, has sunk even from memory, and that it is in the German nation that it has been retained as a peculiar possession. We have received the higher call of Nature to preserve this holy flame, just as the Eumolpidae in Athens had the conservation of the Eleusinian

mysteries, the inhabitants of the island of Samothrace the preservation of a higher divine service ...

There is now no escaping what for anyone raised in the English-speaking philosophical world is bound to be a painful reading experience. From March to August 1843 Marx conjured up the then barely embryonic German proletariat in order to provide an answer to his question, “So where is the positive possibility of German emancipation?” The answer, he asserts, lies:

In the formation of a class with *radical chains* ... an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal character by its universal suffering, and which lays claim to no *particular right* because the wrong it suffers is not a *particular wrong* but wrong in general: a sphere of society which can no longer lay claim to even a *historical* but only a *human* title; ... a sphere, finally, which cannot emancipate itself without ... thereby emancipating all other spheres of society, which, in a word, is the *complete loss* of man and hence can win itself only through the *complete rewinning of man*. The dissolution of society as a particular estate is the *proletariat*.¹⁰

So now, no doubt, we know. And, as if that outburst of drunken pontification were not already too much, here from the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* is something even more abstract, more arbitrary, more technical and - if that is possible - even less concrete, determinate, and in principle falsifiable:

Communism is the *positive* suppression of *private property as human self-estrangement*, and hence the true *appropriation* of human essence through and for man; it is the complete restoration of man to himself as a *social*, i.e., human, being, a restoration which has become conscious and which takes place within the entire wealth of previous states of development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the *genuine* resolution of the conflict between man and nature, the true resolution of the conflict between existence and being, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be the solution. The entire movement of history is therefore both the actual act of creation of communism - the birth of its empirical existence - and, for its thinking consciousness, the *comprehended* and *known* movement of its *becoming* ...¹¹

BASELESS PRETENSIONS TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

That the whole Marxist conceptual scheme was originally derived through an abstract exercise in the tradition of what Marx and Engels hailed as “German classical philosophy”, rather than by any kind of inspection of concrete social and political realities, would have mattered little if only this scheme had happened to fit the facts fairly closely, or if only Marx himself had been prepared to open-mindedly investigate how far, or even whether, it truly did. For to scientists, as opposed perhaps to historians of science, what matters about scientific ideas is not the route by which they happened to come to mind, but how well they fit and how adequately they explain whatever realities are under investigation.

The truth, however, made manifest by all the biographical evidence, is that Marx embarked upon his investigations of actual social and political phenomena already convinced irrevocably that that conceptual scheme constituted a system of synthetic and somehow necessary truth. So the purpose of all the empirical investigations was thus not to test and, where necessary, amend or abandon elements in that conceptual scheme, but to accumulate persuasive empirical support for it, and hence - indirectly - for the practical programme of revolutionary action based thereon.

In 1966 Popper qualified his original, too charitable view of Marx, adding a final note to the fifth edition of *The Open Society*:

Some years after I wrote this ... Leopold Schwarzschild's ... *The Red Prussian* ... became known to me ... it contains documentary evidence, especially from the Marx-Engels correspondence, which shows that Marx was less of a humanitarian, and less of a lover of freedom, than he is made to appear in my book. Schwarzschild describes him as a man who saw in “the proletariat” mainly an instrument of his own personal ambition. Though this may put the matter more harshly than the evidence warrants, it must be admitted that the evidence itself is shattering.

At that time, however, Popper added nothing about Marx as a supposedly sincere seeker after scientific truth.¹² So let us now, drawing upon some characteristically Popperian ideas, proceed to urge that the verdict has to be the same upon both counts. Descartes once remarked that in determining what people sincerely believe, he preferred to look to what they did rather than to what they said. His advice is equally sound with regard to sincerity in general. Hence, in order to prove that they are sincerely pursuing some purpose, the one thing above all that people have to do is be constantly concerned to monitor their success or failure in fulfilling that purpose. If ever and whenever this monitoring reveals that they

are not succeeding, all truly sincere purposers will then and there make that sincerity plain by their readiness to adopt fresh tactics offering better promise of success.

The next step is to relate these logical linkages to Popper's main methodological recommendations. He makes proposals, which are of course close kin the one to the other, for the spheres of both theoretical science and practical policy. In each case Popperian methodology can be seen as the direct and necessary outcome of sincerity in the appropriate purposes. It is the more worthwhile to represent these recommendations in this way, inasmuch as he himself seems never to have done so. His apparent reluctance, and the consequent failure to deploy the most powerful supporting arguments, probably has to be explained by referring to his characteristically generous yet unrealistic reluctance to recognise in any opponents discreditable distractions or even sheer bad faith.

The aim of theoretical science is truth. Given this aim the critical approach must follow. Persons who truly want the truth cannot and will not embrace unexamined candidates. They must and will be ever ready to test, and test and test again. But testing for truth is in this context precisely what criticism is. The purposes of practical policies, and of the institutions established for the implementation of those policies, and the fulfilment of those purposes, are as multifarious as human desires. Yet parallel considerations apply here too. In this case criticism just is probing the effects and effectiveness of the policies in question. How, therefore, can anyone who has indeed been promoting some policy solely in pursuit of some particular cherished end be indifferent to evidence that that end is not being achieved, or be unwilling to alter course in hopes of securing better success?

THE GOOD FAITH OF DARWIN AND THE BAD FAITH OF MARX

Suppose that we begin now to apply these Popperian insights to the original claims that Marx was not only, like Darwin, a sincere seeker after scientific truth, but also a person wholly dedicated to human welfare and emancipation. Consider first, under the first count, the sustained refusal, so rightly emphasised by Schwarzschild, to produce any full, clear, definite, and criticisable summary of “our view”. Long delays in eventual publication could have been excused if there had been such a private summary, for that would have enabled and forced Marx to recognise recalcitrant facts as constituting difficulties for this theory: difficulties requiring either that they should be met or that “our view” itself be either amended or abandoned. (Is there indeed so much as a single passage in the *Collected Works* in which anything at all is thus recognised as a challenging and worrisome difficulty for that never adequately stated theory?)

Especially in the face of the bid by Engels to put Marx on the same plane as Darwin,¹³ it becomes very much to the point to notice that, although the latter was, for different reasons, almost equally reluctant to publish, he did take the first opportunity to compose, both for his private use and for at latest immediately posthumous publication, a crisp, clear, and completely unevasive statement of what his own theory amounted to. The private use of this “sketch of my species theory” was, of course, nothing more or less than to enable and force himself “to recognise recalcitrant facts as constituting difficulties.”

Darwin, indeed, was a model of complete good faith, and of an absolute singlemindedness in the pursuit of truth. Freud wisely commended “the great Darwin” because he “made a golden rule for himself of writing down with particular care observations which seemed unfavourable to his theory, having become convinced that just these would be inclined to slip out of recollection.”¹⁴ (Notoriously, Marx was ever ready to detect and denounce in those whom he perceived as “lackeys of the bourgeoisie” supposedly consequent distortions and biases. But can anyone point to passages in the joint *Collected Works* in which Marx recognised, and strove to counter, parallel possibilities of corruption in his own thinking?)

Darwin too always accepted and lived by the truth of one maxim of the Marquis de Vauvernargues: “For the philosopher” - and for the scientist too - “clarity is a matter of good faith.” For how, where there is obscurity or ambiguity, can we hope to settle the questions of whether assertions were true or policies effective? Let us therefore, by way of contrast, consider a letter from Marx to Engels, date August 15, 1857 - two years before the publication of *The Origin of Species*. It is especially notable inasmuch as it reveals something of what Marx had in mind when he spoke of dialectics or the dialectic method. In the published works those are sometimes commended, but never explained so frankly - if, indeed, at all. (In view of the amount of discredibly revealing material still to be found in the correspondence, it is mind-boggling to try to imagine how much worse were the bits that Engels confessed to having systematically destroyed after his friend’s death.) The four sentences following constitute a completely sufficient indication of fundamental scientific bad faith:

I took the risk of prognosticating in this way, as I was compelled to substitute for you as correspondent at the *Tribune* ... It is possible I may be discredited. But in that case it will still be possible to pull through with the help of a bit of dialectics. It goes without saying that I phrased my forecasts in such a way that I would prove to be right also in the opposed case.

Can we, should we, refrain from repeating the tribute from Engels: “So war dieser Mann der Wissenschaft”?

FALSEHOODS OF IMMISERATION

So far, so very bad. Yet there is far worse to come. To defend his theoretical theses or to further his revolutionary purposes, Marx was on occasion prepared to firmly, repeatedly, and flagrantly misrepresent known social and historical facts. One simple but central and egregiously scandalous example will have to suffice. It will however help to show that Marx was, as Engels said in his obituary address, first and always a revolutionary; albeit, as Engels neither said nor perhaps even noticed, a revolutionary for revolution’s sake rather than for the sake of whatever reliefs to humanity’s estate his revolution might rationally be expected to bring. It was, surely, this consuming revolutionary enthusiasm that led Marx to commit these and other malpractices with falsifying fact.

So consider what is customarily called the Immiseration Thesis. In *The Communist Manifesto* this is asserted in what would appear to be a strictly self-contradictory form: “The modern labourer, instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class.” (Anyone who has lived through successive British national prices-and-incomes-policies will recall that favourite trades-union spokesperson’s cry that, while of course everyone should get at least the average increase, some groups and, in particular - surprise, surprise! - that represented by the speaker, must get a lot more than the average.)

Eschewing, however, on this occasion all such logic-chopping around that particular *Manifesto* formulation, we need only to understand why Marx and Engels had to maintain a strong Immiseration Thesis. For their revolutionary purposes the proletariat must inevitably grow progressively more numerous and poorer, while the capitalists must, equally inevitably and at the same time, grow fewer and richer. These things had to be in order to sustain their cherished historicist prophecy: “What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.”

But, during the working lifetimes of Marx and Engels, all this turned out to be the reverse of the truth. In particular the British statistics, which Marx rightly respected, revealed a secular rise in real wages. What to do? No problem. In the first edition of *Capital* all other runs are given to 1865 or 1866, but those for the movement of wages stop at 1850. In the second edition all other runs are brought up to date, but that of wage movements still stops at 1850.¹⁵

In a two-edged tribute to *Marx as Politician* David Felix describes “*The Civil War in France*, argued with his superb disdain for the facts”, as “the last of Marx’s

polemical masterpieces.¹⁶ Judging by measures of political influence rather than by the standards of historical scholarship, it was indeed an extraordinary achievement. For though Marx himself, in a letter of 22 February 1881 to Ferdinand Nieuwenhuis, admitted that the Paris Commune of 1871 “was in no sense socialist, nor could it have been” this book succeeded in persuading almost everyone - friend and foe alike - that really it had been the first Communist coup, providing a paradigm case of a “dictatorship of the proletariat”.

One clear and memorable example of that “superb disdain for the facts” is the assertion that all elected Councillors and appointed functionaries had “to do their jobs at workingmen’s wages”. The truth was that the 6,000 franc annual wage which the Deputies of the Commune voted for themselves and set as a maximum for state officials was nearly twelve times the amount being paid to members of the National Guard defending Paris.¹⁷

How can we comment save by wryly repeating yet again the words of Engels: “So war dieser Mann der Wissenschaft”?

DEDICATED NEITHER TO TRUTH NOR TO LIBERTY

But now, what about the other half of the question? Does the biographical evidence sustain the thesis that - misguided though he may have been about the means appropriate for securing those admirable ends - Marx was himself personally dedicated to the promotion of liberty and of all things good for the individual? This half of the question (about the personal purposes of Marx) cannot be completely separated from the other half (about his claims to be a sincerely truth-seeking scientist).

The system that Marx and Engels propounded as “scientific socialism” embraced would-be factual contentions of two kinds: those about what has happened and allegedly will happen in history, and those about the consequences that will supposedly result from revolutionary action. So if someone who has been recommending such action as a means to compass those particular consequences is presented with good reasons for believing that in fact the actual consequences would be quite different and even contrary, and if this person remains entirely unmoved, then we have to infer that he has been recommending this revolutionary action for some quite other reason than as an expression of his sincere commitment to achieving those particular consequences.

The most damning evidence against Marx on this second count consists in his consistent and persistent failure to make any effective attempts to answer those critics who argued that the enforcement of full socialism, Marxist-style, would inevitably result, as in fact it

has, in a vastly intensified and more universally repressive form of oriental despotism; or of, as it is euphemistically labeled by Marxists, “the Asiatic mode of production”. That Marx so swiftly abandoned his studies of that phenomenon is doubly significant: first, because it could not be encompassed within, and therefore constituted a falsification of “our view”; and, second, because it provided the best available evidence of the likely political and social effects of establishing a totally centralised command economy.

Schwarzschild notes that this kind of criticism began very early, even before the first publication of the *Communist Manifesto*. Thus even in 1844, Schwarzschild tells us, Arnold Ruge, who was “still a democratic, not a socialist revolutionary”, was protesting that the realisation of the dreams of Marx would be “a police and slave state”. In the year of the *Manifesto*, when Engels explained its ideas to the vice president of Louis Blanc’s party, that luminary responded: “You are leaning towards despotism.” And so on.

The fullest critique to be published during the lifetime of Marx was Bakunin’s *Statehood and Anarchy*, from which Marx copied out passages, adding his own rejoinders, in 1874 and 1875. Marx claimed to have proved that “the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat,” which “itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society.” Bakunin contended that such “proletarian rule” would in fact amount to “the despotism of the ruling minority.”

Hence, “the result is that the vast majority of the people is governed by a privileged minority ... it may perhaps consist of former workmen, but as soon as they become representatives of rulers of the people, they cease to be workmen and view all ordinary workers from the eminence of state; they will then no longer represent the people, but only themselves and their pretensions to govern the people.”

These dire and prescient predictions have been described by - of all people! - Noam Chomsky as “perhaps among the most remarkable within the social sciences”. That Marx made no attempt to publish his own responses suggest that he himself recognised their feeble inadequacy. That he seems never to have been seriously disturbed either by these or by earlier criticisms on the same lines constitutes a further confirmation that he was no more dedicated to increasing the liberties of individuals than to the discovery of social scientific truth.

NOTES

1. Maurice Cornforth, *The Open Philosophy and the Open Society*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1968, p. 27.
2. That such partisan devotion - to which, surely, there is no parallel in the natural sciences - is, apparently, acceptable to their colleagues ought to raise some question about the scientific status of these disciplines. See, for instance, my 'Marxism: Religious Faith and Bad Faith', in *Reason Papers No. 12*, Department of Philosophy, Auburn University, Alabama, Spring 1987.
3. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1945.
4. Clarendon, Oxford, 1978.
5. R. Milliband, in *Political Studies*, vol. xxix, no. 1, p. 117.
6. Tony Benn, review in *New Society*, 3 November 1983.
7. For present purposes the best source is Leopold Schwarzschild's *The Red Prussian*, Pickwick, London, 1986. This is a reissue of a work first translated into English in 1948, which therefore makes no mention of the fathering of a never-acknowledged son by the live-in servant Lenchen Demuth. This book is now available only directly from the publisher.
8. For a historical study of the relation between these two ideas, see Melvin Lasky, *Utopia and Revolution*, University of Chicago Press, 1977.
9. For much more on the incongruity of this secular revelation compare my 'Prophecy or Philosophy?' in Ronald Duncan and Colin Wilson, eds., *Marx Refuted: The Verdict of History*, Ashgrove, Bath, 1987.
10. *Contribution to Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law* in the *Collected Works*, Vol. III, p. 186; emphasis, of course, in the original.
11. In *Early Writings*, translated by R. Livingstone and G. Berton, introduced by L. Colletti, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1975, p. 368.
12. He has since said in a private letter that he intends, if opportunity arises, to add a further note dismissing the scientific pretensions of Marx for reasons similar to those deployed in the text above.
13. For a fuller comparison between the scientific claims of Darwin and of Marx, see my *Darwinian Evolution*, Granada/Paladin, London, 1984, Chapter III, p. 3.
14. Sigmund Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, translated by Joan Rivière, Allen and Unwin, London, 1922, p. 61.
15. See Bernard Wolfe, *Marxism: 100 Years of a Doctrine*, Chapman and Hall, London, 1967, p. 323.
16. David Felix, *Marx as a Politician*, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, Illinois, 1983, p. 175.
17. See Wolfe, Ch. 8; and compare Felix, p. 166ff.